Davidson makes an argument for his version of non-reductive physicalism. The argument relies on the. Donald Davidson wanted to resolve what he saw as a conflict in all Anomalous monism postulates token event identity without psychophysical laws. From the. Summary, Anomalous Monism is a philosophical theory about the mind-body relationship, Davidson’s argument for the view is that it resolves the apparent.
|Published (Last):||22 January 2006|
|PDF File Size:||16.35 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||14.58 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
For the anomalous monist, the plausibility of property dualism derives from the fact that although mental states, events and processes have genuine causal powers, the causal relationships that they enter into with physical entities cannot be explained by appeal to fundamental laws of nature.
It was a topic of energetic debate and disagreement among English-speaking philosophers for the last thirty years of the twentieth century. But whenever he actually sets about the task of defending the statement that mental events cause physical events, what is at issue always turns out to be a distinctively methodological question: Anomalous Monism AM is a philosophical thesis about the place of the mind and of mental states in the natural order.
Nonetheless, AM is distinguished from other positions in the philosophy of mind by the three following claims:. Taken separately, none of these claims has won anything like universal support from philosophers in the contemporary tradition. And proponents of a reductionist view of the mind, at least as this sort of position has traditionally been articulated, would certainly have to deny the truth of 3.
Even if none of these arguments are successful, this trio of claims gives off a pretty strong whiff of inconsistency. Nonetheless, Davidson maintains that all three are true. The best route to understanding this is to start out by taking a somewhat broader look at the relevant historical backdrop. The early modern philosopher whose views on the relationship between mind and body bear the closest similarity to AM is Benedict De Spinoza.
Like most philosophers of his period, Spinoza was preoccupied with the central problem of the Cartesian inheritance, namely, that of accounting for the apparently systematic causal interaction between mind and body. This problem had arisen for Descartes specifically because he had believed that mind and body were discrete types of substances with irreconcilable natures.
Contra Descartes, Spinoza denied that mind and body were separate substances at all, and proposed instead that they are merely separate attributes of a single substance. Spinoza showed no obvious sign of interest in whether one of these two causal orders is more fundamental. But since he was a strict determinist, it seems he believed that the relations that obtain among the items belonging to both causal sequences were law-like in nature.
He may thus plausibly be read as having accepted the truth of something like statement 1. This might make it appear that he have endorsed statement 3 of our original trilemma at the price of rejecting statement 1. But this is perfectly consistent with the truth of statement 1. In this qualified sense, then, Spinozistic parallelism may be viewed as a genuine historical precursor to AM.
Two questions immediately arise about the doctrine of parallelism as just described. But then why suppose that just any physical event, no matter how simple the movement of a single electron, say must have an ideational correlate? If one chooses to hypothesize that a specific degree of physical complexity is necessary for a mental phenomenon to occur, then the threat or promise of reductionism looms.
But most contemporary philosophers would certainly favor reductionism over the alternative of panpsychism that Spinoza himself embraces [de Spinoza,p. Interestingly Davidson himself also ends up embracing an analog of panpsychism in the course of his struggle to harmonize statements 1 — 3. For most of the twentieth century, philosophers both on the European continent and in English-speaking universities had been preoccupied with the autonomy of humanistic enquiry.
This issue was and continues to be a source of disagreements that extend well beyond the relatively narrow boundaries of metaphysical debate and into the realms of institutional policymaking and literary and artistic culture. To others, however — mechanists, materialists and methodological monists about the sciences — such claims were deemed to be either patently false or well-nigh incomprehensible [See Anthony,p.
In a famous example, Davidson describes a situation in which a mountain climber accidentally causes the death of another man by loosening his grip on a tethering rope.
In this second case, the reason that the first climber had for being concerned for his own safety was also a cause of the death of the second climber. But then there is a differentiation between reasons that are not causes and reasons which are.
Donald Davidson: Anomalous Monism
We must first ask why Davidson annomalous that mental events are identical with physical events, and then ask why he nonetheless denies the reducibility of the one to the other.
This is the doctrine that while mental properties types cannot be identified with physical properties, mental particulars tokens can anomalou identified with particular, spatio-temporally determinate physical entities. Davidson is not the only influential analytic philosopher to have defended this doctrine, but his reasons for doing so arise from a fairly idiosyncratic set of views.
The identity conditions of events can furthermore, he thinks, be established purely extensionally: So what, then counts as a genuinely mentalistic description of any given event?
That is, true descriptions of mental events include a verb with a subject that refers to a person, and a complement for which the usual rules of monidm break down.
It is important to recognize, however, that intensionality is for Davidson merely a sufficient condition for mentality; he does not seem to regard it as being even close to necessary. For the more inclusive our criteria for mentality are, the more reason we will have to accept that all mental events are identical to physical events [Davidson,p.
And this makes it look as though the defender of AM will either have to explain away an unpalatable form of causal over-determination in the natural sciences, or else regard mental events as being purely epiphenomenal.
Davidson responds to challenges of this general type by re-iterating his commitment to a strictly extensionalist account wnomalous event-causation. It is simply infelicitous, he thinks, to suppose that whether or not one event is the cause of another depends upon our ability to connect up their properties in any sort of statement whatsoever, whether law-like daviddon not.
Many philosophers have found this characterization of causality by Davidson singularly implausible. For it does not seem as though extensionalism by itself simply implies that events do not have the causal powers that they do by virtue of falling under causal laws [see McLaughlin,pp.
But the supervenience relation anomaloous one that has been characterized in multitudinous different ways in late twentieth-century philosophy [See Kim, for a fairly exhaustive catalogue]. Not all of the accounts that have been given would provide equally good support for this contention. What, then, are some reasons that the defender of AM might give for denying that mental concepts are simply reducible to physical ones?
He clearly regards the notion of supervenience as representing a sort of panacea for anyone skeptical about the possibility of reconciling statements 1 – 3 [Davidson,p. So what, precisely, is the supervenience relation supposed to amount to? The earliest instance of an appeal to the notion of supervenience in the twentieth century was by S.
Anomalous Monism: Entry
Pepper, in a paper first published in Davidson himself acknowledges having borrowed the term from R. Unlike Pepper, both Hare and Davidson characterize supervenience in explicitly linguistic terms, without reference to metaphysical notions like emergence that omnism supposed to be antecedently clear.
What is most striking about this characterization of the supervenience relation is its apparent weakness. He first suggests that we think of mentalistic predicates as being like the Tarskian truth predicate and the vocabulary of physics as being like the resources that are present within a natural language to describe its own syntax.
For the truth predicate as Tarski describes it had the following important characteristic: If this claim were correct, then it would certainly be difficult to see how a Davidsonian could claim that there were no strict laws of nature connecting mental properties with physical ones. Blackburn parses supervenience claims as non-trivial restrictions upon how we conceive of the possibility that different sorts of objects could exist within the same world.
Nonetheless, he thinks that our default modal intuitions should cause us to rankle whenever we are presented anomaalous a claim having the form of S. This, according to Blackburn, is the key metaphysical question that the doctrine of AM compels us to ask, but for which its advocates have never really provided an answer [Blackburn,p. The advocate of AM would surely, after all, not want to deny that it is at least logically possible for a world to contain two physically identical beings, one with a mind and one without, not that such a circumstance fell entirely outside the range of human conceivability.
Thus, if the question that Blackburn asks about supervenience is the right one to pose to the anomalous monist, then we may at this stage draw an important methodological conclusion. A universal generalization is law-like, according to Davidson, just so long as it provides support for a suitably broad set of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. Anomalouw repeatedly claims that such completely exceptionless generalizations are most likely to be found in theoretical physics.
But this assertion is not defended. In response to these sorts of concerns, a fairly broad contingent of philosophers of science have defended accounts of the concept of a natural law which represent scientific knowledge as being heteronomic through and through [See e.
Cartwright, and Fodor ]. Perhaps the monixm way to explain changes in belief or short-term memory is by making generalizations that refer either implicitly or explicitly to other beliefs or memories. How would it affect the case for AM if it were to davixson out that we could make these sorts of generalizations connecting physical concepts with mentalistic ones? Upon this topic, opinions diverge quite broadly. This would, of course, be bad news for the advocate of AM.
If there are true SDLs that connect up the vocabulary of psychology with the vocabulary of physical science in this sort of way, then there is at least one sense in which statement 3 must clearly be regarded as false. But Zangwill proposes that the defender of AM may still have good grounds for believing that mental phenomena are anomalous in something very much like the way that Davidson originally supposed.
They are clearly not the sorts of generalizations that could be conclusively verified without appeal to a background theory consisting at least for the most part of more simply structured law-like generalizations. There do, then, appear to be a wide anomlaous of claims that differ both in davidosn and in logical form, but which may nonetheless be entirely plausible candidates for the status of laws of nature. But then from whence comes the surprisingly powerful conviction shared by Davidson and his sympathizers of the falsity of statement 3?
It is impossible to understand why Davidson subscribes to this radical view without becoming acquainted with his views about the norms of empirical methodology that govern all forms of humanistic anomaloux.
But whenever he actually sets about the task of defending statement 1what is at mknism always turns out to be a distinctively methodological question. Davideon is this cluster of distinctly normative concepts that seem to represent the principal ingredients in our everyday concept of rationality.
Because the methodology whereby radically unfamiliar languages may be interpreted requires us to treat the speakers of these languages as predominantly rational, for Davidson semantics cannot be reduced to syntax [Davidson, b, monjsm.
New problems will of course arise for the defender of AM who treats it as a straightforward consequence of these sorts of methodological considerations. Philosophers have, after all, had widely divergent intuitions about just dvaidson the connection might be between such normative injunctions and the laws of nature.
Other more general worries arise in connection with the very idea that the concept of causation has a distinctive sort of usefulness in explicitly normative contexts.
But in this case, our descriptions of the cause and of the effect would appear to lack the sort of logical independence from one another that true causal statements are usually or at least common-sensically required to have. That we find ourselves faced with this daunting prospect when we try to determine the prospects for achieving a reconciliation of statements 1 – 3 is perhaps something of a disappointment.
But it should also perhaps not surprise one too much. The general problem of discerning where the boundary lies between epistemology anmalous metaphysics is, after all, just one more part of the Cartesian legacy. A Trilemma Anomalous Monism AM is a philosophical thesis about the place of the mind and of mental states in the natural order.
Nonetheless, AM is distinguished from davisdon positions in the philosophy of mind by the three following claims: Mental events cause physical events. All causal relationships are backed by natural laws.
There are no natural laws connecting mental phenomena with physical phenomena. Parallelism The early modern philosopher whose views on the relationship between mind and body bear the closest similarity to AM is Benedict De Spinoza.
The Irreducibility of the Mental a. Language, Mind and Epistemology: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Oxford University Press, First published in The MIT Press,