The Meaning of Alan García: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru1. 3 Alan García, “El síndrome del perro del hortelano”, El Comercio. a los actores de las resistencias locales como «perros», colocados en una pobreza, ingenuidad o ignorancia, y como lo calificó Alan García en el texto que .. El Síndrome del perro del hortelano, Diario El Comercio, 1 Los artículos de Alan García en fueron dos: El síndrome del perro del hortelano, del 28 de octubre (
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Alan García and Peru: a tale of two eras | openDemocracy
Log In Sign Up. The Meaning of Alan Garcia: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru. Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru1. For Badiou, the French elections revealed that France was in the grips of two types of fear, primitive fear and a fear of fear, or a derivative fear. Very recent examples of this politics include new policies banning the use of the burqa in public places and moves to forcibly remove Roma communities.
Foucault suggests that governmentality emerged in the eighteenth century as a form of power distinct from sovereign power which he sees as having territory as its target and discipline or what he calls police as its chief apparatus dispositif. Governmentality operates in an analogous way to what Foucault refers to as pastoral power garci roots in the Judeo-Christian traditionwhich in some ways he sees as a prelude to governmentality, in sidnrome sense that governmental power operates through the management of the population and no longer through its police: Foucault acknowledges as much in his discussion of Nazi Germany in his lectures, where he explores the interplay between the disciplinary and regulatory dimensions of biopower the sindrrome of life or power over life- a concept first introduced in the History of Sexuality vol.
Particularly important is the central role that Foucault gives to racism as that which inscribes biopower as a key mechanism of state power. In other words, for Agamben the management of the population is not a characteristic of governmental rule but rather the prerogative of the sovereign, who has the power to determine which lives are garxia living and which are amenable to be killed with impunity.
It is in relation to neoliberalism that the commensurability of sovereign power and governmentality presents perhaps the most interesting analytic possibilities. Wendy Brown, for example, has argued that neoliberalism is best understood as a political rationality: Neo-liberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximizing corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neo-liberalism carries a social analysis which, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire.
Neo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player Ong, meanwhile, examines the ways in which neoliberal governmentality is deployed selectively, through what she calls graduated sovereignty, in ways that, in effect, reproduce and reassert other forms of exclusion: What the fear expresses is the belief that indigeneity is a block to national advancement.
And like previous projects of rule it is, to put it mildly, abrasive, precisely because it operates primarily through sovereign power rather than governmentality.
el sindrome del perro del hortelano alan garcia pdf
The speech is best described as business-like; and it was the business-like character of the speech that his supporters applauded and that his critics disapproved of. As physical and financial capital whether it be new infrastructural horteano or international reserves expands significantly in Peru, the under-investment in human capital is all the more striking.
This is part of the story of course. But the divergence is also expressive of the particular configuration of aoan and governmentality in Peru. Growth rates are among the highest in the world. Certainly, in the global financial crisis registered in a sharp downturn in GDP but unlike most economies, Peru continued to grow in large part thanks to a fiscal stimulus equivalent to ten percent of GDPalbeit at a very low rate.
For sure, export commodities continue to play a key role in Peru economic fortunes, but the export quantum, though still dominated by minerals, is increasingly diversified and includes both a growing range of non-traditional primary commodities particularly foodstuffs such as asparagus, paprika, mangos and coffeeand manufactured foods.
More important, there are increasing signs of a meaningful diversification in the engines of growth away from primary exports and towards internal consumption, particularly in the sphere of housing a transformation which reflects a growing access to credit for a broader proportion of the Peruvian population- on which more below. Diversification is also apparent hkrtelano capital formation in Peru: Yet, as many observers stress, this economic bonanza is far from being unproblematic.
If class has any meaning in Peru today it is primarily as an expression of consumption, much of it conspicuous for sure, rather than production more Thorstein Veblen than Karl Marx. And the key apparatus of class distinction is arguably access to credit. In a sense, Peruvian society is divided into three social classes: The visibility of gardia is most evident in the extraordinary construction boom that the city has experienced, and which, as I have already noted, now plays a key role as an engine of growth.
Prior to the s, self-construction ostensibly was the only option for lower income Peruvians, in Lima as elsewhere. Today, much of the construction boom, led by construction companies large and small, is directed at so-called sectors C and D who are now able to access credit at reasonable rates.
The hero, Santiago, a soldier who has returned from a tour of duty in the highlands and is having difficulty reintegrating into civilian life, is denied credit in a white-goods store where he is trying to buy an appliance. The scene vividly illustrates the social death that results from the denial of credit, the banishment of the hero to a status of non-being, outside of society.
Credit, in short, has become a marker of citizenship. Critics argue that highly favourable tax and royalty regimes have created an attractive set of conditions for foreign mining, hydrocarbon, and infrastructure companies, reflected in substantial capital inflows, but at a high cost: Moreover, lax environmental supervision, deficient labour legislation, and rarely enforced corporate responsibility legislation have produced a series of conflicts pitting largely unaccountable firms against local communities in which the government has typically sided with the former.
To be sure, some social benefit has accrued from this growth, not sindromf in the shape of some downward pressure on poverty levels and an expansion in employment in certain economic sectors and certain parts of the country. Fujimori channelled extensive resources through the Ministry of the Presidency with which he was very closely identified including through the use of a particular colour of paint — orange — in order to set up physical testaments to his rule in the shape of schools and hospitals.
One way edl to suggest that it corresponds to a deviation from a norm and argue that problems inherent to Peru account for the failure of neoliberal reforms to map seamlessly onto, or, indeed, beget, liberal democracy. Such problems include institutional alam structural obstacles to optimal institutional arrangements — typically recalcitrant unions or, say, a poorly educated workforce and, as Nobel winner Mario Vargas Llosa suggests, a cultural aversion to modernity.
Another is to argue that contrary to what are ultimately tenuous assumptions about the commensurability between liberal democracy and neoliberal economics, neoliberalism is, in fact, perfectly compatible with, and may in fact favour the advent of less- than-liberal politics something that, of course, Chileans and Argentines who lived through aalan neoliberal experiments of their military juntas know better than most.
Kurt Weyland has pointed to the synergies and affinities that characterize neoliberalism and neopopulism; that is hortelnao say, Weyland has perrro the ways in which economic policies associated with neoliberalism cross-fertilise with the political policies associated with neopopulism ; This brings us back both to the dog in the manger rhetoric and to sovereignty and governmentality.
Instead Peru, today and in the past, is best characterized by the presence of islands of governmentality in a sea of sovereignty.
It is a configuration that accounts for the fact that historically projects of rule in Peru have been enacted not for but against the population. Put otherwise, these conflicts reveal how for the purposes of resource extraction, the biopolitical management of populations that are perceived to be recalcitrant or outright hostile is performed not through governmental power through dispositions that make populations behave as they ought but rather through sovereign power; through police or discipline.
There is, for the most part, no attempt here to rule through extending freedom to these populations; in fact it is their freedom that is perceived to be the problem. But the deployment of sovereign power over these populations reflects more than a strategy to manage their recalcitrance. It expresses the belief that these populations are in fact not amenable to governmentalization by virtue of who they are.
In other words, what mediates the differentiation between populations considered amenable to sovereign power and populations considered amenable to governmentality is only partially how they relate politically to neoliberal projects and primarily how their identities as, say, poor indigenous women who happen to have joined a protest over industrial pollution, determine their commensurability with those very same neoliberal projects.
Herein then lies the importance of the sovereign prerogative to declare who is the internal enemy because the enemy is not exclusively a political enemy but also, and in fact primarily, a biopolitical one.
It is, on the one hand, a logical strategy. The strategy is impeccable of course: Shining Path brought Peru to the edge of national implosion; the anti-mining protesters are doing likewise. Since it is the prerogative of the sovereign to defend the national territory against internal and external enemies, it follows that the sovereign is entitled to discipline the anti-mining protesters much as it did the Shining Path militants.
Who could question this prerogative or demand accountability from the sovereign when the polity is in such danger? By law, Peruvians must fly the national flag on 28 July, national day, when the country celebrates independence from Spain in In mid in the Miraflores district of Lima, someone decided to hang a Peruvian flag from their balcony.
The police arrived with the press in tow. One news network set about interviewing some of the neighbours who appeared concerned by the presence of the flag; a worrying reminder no doubt of the years of insecurity that Peruvians lived through in the s and early s. But what was most striking about this episode was the comment one of the neighbours made to a news reporter.
During the years of the internal armed conflict, many white middle- class Peruvians began to suspect, and certainly to fear, that their empleadas were Senderistas. The origin of this fear was a simple conflation, indeed the very conflation that likely led the neighbour to associate an empleada with the MRTA: Shining Path, it was argued, had originated in the Andean highlands, specifically in Ayacucho, one of the poorest and, so it was claimed, backward and forsaken regions of Peru, and was beginning to penetrate the cities, and particularly Lima.
This fear, it must be understood, was a highly racialized fear, a fear born of equal amounts of ignorance of, and contempt towards, the indigenous and the Andean. The dog in the manger rhetoric interpellates a communist threat that evokes still very real fears in the Peruvian population in order to legitimate itself. As I have suggested elsewhere, the idea that the indigenous represent an obstacle to Peru has deep historical roots and is key to the myriad racialized inequalities and exclusions that characterize Peruvian society.
This analysis suggests that the configuration of sovereignty and governmentality in neoliberal Peru resembles most closely the configuration of sovereignty and governmentality in colonial contexts, Latin American and otherwise. As scholars of colonialism in Africa and Asia have suggested, one of the key paradoxes of European colonial regimes is that typically in the course of the nineteenth and, particularly, twentieth centuries, European powers extended freedom to their citizens in the metropolis while actively denying it to populations in their colonial peripheries.
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Projects of rule in the metropolis were not transposed to the colonies. Rather projects of rule specific to colonial contexts were devised. Forms of colonial sovereignty or what Achille Mbembe has called commandement and colonial governmentality therefore emerged. The role of racism in colonial contexts or indeed in any context was to normalize and naturalize hierarchies. But it served also to establish, and justify, distinctions between populations amenable to sovereign power or, indeed, what Gacia calls necropower; the power to subject vast populations to a status of living dead and populations amenable to governmental power; to improvement.
Naturally, there was significant variation between colonial regimes and sites of colonialism, and overlap in sovereign and governmental technologies of rule. But the overall tendency is clear, and serves to contextualize the Peruvian case. I merely wish to point to the affinities that exist between the particular configuration of sovereignty and governmentality in Peru and in colonial contexts in order to further clarify the role of racism, or of a particular racial grammar, in articulating sovereignty and governmentality in the Peruvian context.
The pegro of political and biopolitical enemies in the dog in the manger rhetoric serves to legitimate a broader discourse which presents the indigenous, and that which they represent, as an obstacle to progress both because they oppose, say, the exploitation of natural resources in the highlands or the building of a road in the Sindroje, but also because, as Indians, they are anathema to progress and therefore incapable, qua Indians, of being subjects of progress.
This is why, in effect, the indigenous are no different to communists and why, as communists, they are amenable to be declared internal enemies by the sovereign. The first article, published on 28 Aprilwas ostensibly a response to a letter sent by APRODEH, a Peruvian human rights organization, to the European parliament in which it argued that a motion to include the MRTA in a list of terrorist organizations served no real purpose since the organization had been inactive for many years.
The image of Peru presented in the second article was the polar opposite of the image presented in the first: The primary problems faced by this government are administrative: Surely the increasingly positive risk assessments need to be revised?
The 3 May article needs to be read therefore primarily as a rectification: It shares much with the capitalist hortelanoo of his immediate predecessors, Fujimori and Toledo, and indeed with other cultural and economic or culturo-economic projects of rule of the past.
In this formulation progress becomes contingent on overcoming such obstacles; typically this translates wlan discursive and embodied assaults on such sectors of the population; assaults legitimated, as I have shown by discursive strategies that sindromme those perceived as opposed to, say, mining or hydrocarbon concessions or road building to hottelano groups whose object is to destroy the Peruvian nation.
Inevitably in a country such as Peru, this is a highly racialized, indeed racist project. I have no answer to the question of what those of us who reject such projects of rule can do to oppose them. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. De quoi Sarkozy est-il le nom? Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes.
Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy. Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De- Democratization.
Political Theory 34 6: