J. Hessen is the author of Teoria do Conhecimento ( avg rating, 3 ratings, 1 review). HESSEN, J. Teoria do conhecimento. Coimbra: Arménio Amado, INMON, WH. Como construir o data warehouse. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, Goldstein, J. () Emergence as a construct: history and issues. Emergence 1( 1): Hessen, J. () Teoria do Conhecimento, trans. J. Vergílio and G. Cuter.

Author: Kashakar Zum
Country: Germany
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Music
Published (Last): 9 October 2012
Pages: 62
PDF File Size: 1.7 Mb
ePub File Size: 12.76 Mb
ISBN: 260-2-38700-243-1
Downloads: 37922
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Nigar

This essay presents an investigation into the possibility of inference of causality from historical research, starting from the perception that the encounter of the causal explanation of an event is among the main motivations of many researchers. It begins with an explanatory analysis of cause, determinism and principle of causality, followed by history and historical method.

It uses bibliographic data and positions itself as an interaction of social practice. The analysis was made from dialogical debates on content and theoretical triangulations, with the application of a dialectical model, based on positivism and interpretivism. The work seeks to bring to the scientific community an analysis on the subject. The present work wishes to answer a curiosity about the possibility of inferring causality when using the method and historical theory.

History, as a rule, has a narrative, descriptive character. In addition, it is permeated by the mediation of the researcher, who interprets the documents and data that he has collected. But would the act of interpreting itself be able to dismiss the causality of systematically conducted historical research?

In turn, the cause is linked to just using generalizable, empirically observable and replicable facts? And considering this question about the experimental character of the cause, will it be possible to conduct historical research linked to these presuppositions? In order to clarify these doubts, the present article sought knowledge in philosophical, scientific and also in organizational studies.

The article was designed with a vision to a better understanding of the findings, dividing it into an introduction, theoretical reference, methodology, arguments and analysis and conclusions. In the first part the initial idea is presented. In the theoretical reference are placed the central ideas obtained from the literature found on the subject, which per passed general areas such as philosophy, sociology, education and organizational studies and the methodology employed in them.

In the arguments and analysis the answer about the research problem is developed, not without situating the theme ontologically and epistemologically, theoretically and philosophically.

Document :: SPELL – Scientific Periodicals Electronic Library

Finally, the conclusions are presented, when, in fact, the research problem is answered and further research on the subject is recommended. The theoretical framework involving this research has its beginning in the positioning of the researcher in relation to reality and to knowledge.

Thus, hhessen from the ontological and epistemological dimensions that surround the work. Ontology, according to Grix 1 is “the image of the social reality upon which a theory is based” 1p. Thus, according to the author, ontology is positioned within the perspectives of objectivism and constructivism, where d first “affirms that social phenomena and their meanings exist independently j.teorria social actors” 2P. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction, but are j.tteoria constant state of review 2pp.

As the construction of social phenomena and their meanings depend, in this context, on j.teorix actors, it becomes possible to affirm that such dependence refers to the subjectivity of each actor, so that in the sequence of this work the constructivist perspective will be addressed as subjectivism, to better position the role of each social actor. Still in Grix 1epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge and with the possible ways of obtaining knowledge from social reality.

It focuses on the process of collecting knowledge and is positioned in the perspectives of positivism and interpretivism. According to Bryman 2 the first “advocates the application of natural science methods to study social reality and beyond” 2p.

In the preamble of the argumentative discussions about the object of study of this work, emerges the debate about the relation between events or events in a temporal continuum. The different positioning in the temporal continuum presupposes occurrences at different times or periods, referring the study to the possibility of historical research.

Hesse, the heart of this discussion is the cause between events j.teria happen, hence the causality between events. Od is necessary, then, to outline similar positions surrounding the cause, for a correct positioning of the object of study.

The first of these positions is the very cause, where the concept of Popper 3 that permeates the deduction of the utterance will be approached, therefore with a deductive character from the linguistic perspective.

The cause, in the context of this work, will be treated as motivation or reason between two or more events. The second position is the determinism, which can easily be confused with cause. Determinism, of inductive nature, will be treated from the point of view of Bastos Filho 4 who sees it more as a predictive capacity rather than a motivating one. Such point of view makes possible the characterization of conhecimmento as a reductionism of causality, since its amplitude is limited to a capacity to predict.


Finally, the third position j.teorua that of the principle of conhecimrnto, which offers a synthesis for the dialectical question of causal deduction cojhecimento deterministic induction. According to Popper 3 and Hessen 5 events have causes, but Popper 3 states that events can be deductively predicted, broadening the concept a little.

Bastos Filho 6 also enters this sphere, bringing the Leibniz principle of sufficient reason, associating it with the motivation between events, and therefore causality, taking it to a position similar to the principle of causality. Setting the object of study in the field, the work follows on to the possibilities of causal inference through historical research. The first possibility is that of linguistics, as an instrument for the analysis of the nexus between events, where Hessem 7 suggests that causality can be expressed by “causal expressions”, the cause being a central concept in history.

Then, in an organizational context, Nascimento et al 8 brings an interpretative approach where the historical fact is constructed by the historian, in the present. Ferreira 9 raises positions for historical research and eo for the reconstruction of reality through historical trajectory.

Teoria Tridimensional Do Direito Miguel Reale Pdf Lições Preliminares De Direito Pdf Miguel Reale

Gomes and Santana 4 add with the inclusion of oral history as a possibility to reveal reality. Pessoa Jr 10 also addresses causality, however from a philosophical perspective.

The author presents causes in sufficient sets, represented by the acronym INUS Insuficient, Necessary, Unecessary, Suficientrevealing that there are vo than one set of conditions to produce an effect, contradicting the positivist view that a cause is a necessary and sufficient condition. It also presents a typology of philosophical conceptions of causality, composed of causality as a substantial relation, in which causality involves a real or substantial relation between two events, within a rational dimension; causality as regularity, in which “causation” would be a name given to phenomena of constant conjunction or correlation, which express a regularity or a law” p.

Such a procedure is taken as a definition conhecimentoo causation. Finally, the author deals with probabilistic causation, in which the causal relation is conceived by a probabilistic relation, adapted to the conceptions of the typology presented, and closes with causal models of real situations, developed from the ideas exposed by him.

Maar 11in his work on causal explanation and history, presents the summary of the trajectory of the idea of causality in the writing of history from the metaphysical conceptions, through the neopositivist to the analytic ones.

It discusses a neopositivist approach to history, in which historians should seek out causal laws, even probabilistic ones, corroborating with the thinking that conbecimento nomological-deductive model is the only reliable source of causal explanations and scientific knowledge. He argues that the writing of hesen also uses causal relations, but with non-nomological types of causal explanations.

The author advocates that. Instead of rejecting causality, historians should reject only the use of laws, since the nature of their explanations are descriptions of particular events in a rational but not scientific way. The presence of causality in historical texts is the only way to keep history on the path of rational activity and seeks to confirm theories in empirical evidence Abstract. This work is a product of a priori thinking of its authors. The idea arose from a debate on historical research, where the question was raised regarding the possibility of causal inference from its application.

Since it is a theoretical essay, it positions itself as an interaction within a social practice, where it seeks to bring to the scientific community the analysis developed on its theme. Its object of study is the causal inferences within the method of historical research, investigating the possibility of causal inference from historical research.

The data collection hrssen done eminently from bibliographical surveys and the analysis from dialogical debates about content and theoretical triangulations. It uses a dialectical model and its epistemological basis is positivism and interpretivism. The argument is presented within the adopted epistemological aspects and uses the contextualization from the theoretical reference for the development of the analysis, for which the object of study was fragmented into two great parts: Causality was confronted with determinism and synthesized with the principle of causality.

The second, the context of history, in which historical research was chosen as a method for analysis.

Research, Society and Development

It is understood that it is possible to study history from other methods, but one cannot use historical research without history.

Before entering into the question that gave life to the present work, it is important to distinguish the ontological assumptions from the epistemological ones, and to differentiate them from what comes to be methodology and method. In an attempt to support research in the social sciences, Morgan and Smircich 12 have stated that as regards the conception of reality and about human nature, schools of thought extend between the objective and subjective perspectives, being arranged in a continuum In this continuum, the approaches range from the subjectivist to the objective in the following categorization With regards to conceptions about human nature, the authors drew up another continuum based on the visions of man as: The ontological assumptions presented by Morgan and Smircich 12 vary from the conception that reality is a projection of individual consciousness, to the conception that it is external, concrete and real, as well as the natural world.


In this continuum, there are theories that admit the interaction ocnhecimento man and reality. In this conhecjmento there are theories that admit that man acts according to the meanings that, by interpretative processes, attributes to the situations and others that understand that reality is j.georia from the performance of man, being external to him and amenable to reproduction in similar environmental conditions.

Considering the contributions of Morgan and Smircich 12 and taking into account the concept of ontology by Grix 1it is possible to affirm that between the forms cnhecimento social reality is understood there are objectivist positions, that defend that reality is independent of the subject, and subjectivist positions, which understand that subjects, collectively, construct reality through a continuous process.

To understand this reality, we adopt epistemologies that are coherent with the ontology to which the researcher aligns. There are epistemologies that are equally more objectivistic and others more subjectivist. The most common example of objectivist epistemology is positivism.

As for the subjectivist researches, of an interpretative nature the examples are in qualitative research, in which phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and constructivism are epistemes that can be cited for exemplification Since epistemologies are a way of conducting studies about reality, it is necessary to adopt a methodology, that is, a way of thinking about social reality, studying it In carrying out the activities necessary to the search for knowledge, methods must be employed, which are procedures and techniques designed to j.teoriia and analyze data Historiography, according to Ferreira 9conhefimento that history received a theoretical-methodological reformulation in the twentieth century, failing to be seen under the functionalist and progressive aspect, and beginning to be conceived by more interpretative aspects, in which history and culture together are elements of comprehension of reality.

The method of the use of documents, for example, underwent transformations; inasmuch did not fail to consider the presence of acts of will and elements of power in the production or not of these means of transmission of history 8. History is thus both theory and methodology used in present times for the understanding and explanation of reality.

This will be better addressed later. The encounter of causality, or the causal explanation of an event, is among the main motivations of many researchers, particularly those who have in the natural sciences their research strand, within objectivist ontology and a positivist epistemology. However, within the social sciences such condition is more susceptible to variations, making events less linear than those arising from conhecimetno natural sciences.

For some this may j.teorka to the impossibility of talking about the inference of causality in historical j.teogia, although for others it is not quite so. Let us take epistemological plurality as a starting point. It is true that events in the social sciences can be analyzed also from positivism. However, there is a great incremental epistemological myriad that allows countless other possibilities of analysis of events. Such epistemologies do not necessarily conform to the concept of causality, as conceived in the natural sciences, especially in chronologically ordered events.

If one event happened before another does not mean that it is the cause of the last, but it may have determined it. The cause may remain in i.teoria mediate and not immediate instance 5making necessary the distinction between cause, determinism and the very principle of causality. In a rapid conhecimneto, the cause, or the offering of a causal explanation of an event, “means to deduce a statement which describes it, using, as premises of deduction, one or more universal laws, combined with certain singular statements, the initial conditions” 3p.

However the cause is not necessarily the explanation of the relationship between successive events in a temporal continuum. As stated, the cause, heszen in the broad sense presented, causal explanation, or even the causal nexus, may be an inference underlying the motives of events, even in a volitional instance, but not necessarily its origin.

Hessrn consequence of jj.teoria event chronologically subsequent to another can be a deterministic act and not of causal consequence.

Here comes our second conceptual revisit: If on j.yeoria hand the cause assumes a deductive character from a linguistic, as a rule, descriptive, determinism orbits in a sphere dominated by an inductive world, in which “the past is equal to the future and in which there is nothing new and creative in the light of the sun” 6p.

Thus, determinism is more related to predictability than to motivation, as put by Popper on scientific determinism 6. Therefore, we conclude that determinism is a reductionist concept of cause, or more specifically of causality, precisely because its instance is circumspect to the capacity to predict, which is cohecimento limited.